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The paper laments the current confusion in business science with regard to 
its epistemology. Any scientific discipline needs a firm structural basis, 
otherwise research is unfocused and flawed. In business science not even 
the vocabulary is clear: terms like Management and Business Administration 
mean many things to different people. The paper suggests to replace Burrell 
and Morgan’s matrix of sociological paradigms with a new typology which is 
really able to guide research and practice alike. Management scholars have 
argued too long without any sense of direction and managers have as a 
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1.      Introduction 
 
Business science is a wide field encompassing very diverse research programmes and even the 
usage of terms like business science, management, management science etc. differs from 
academic community to academic community. What the discipline lacks is a meta-structure, or, 
to put it provocatively, the discipline needs discipline. This paper will not make the naive and 
megalomaniac claim to presenting a complete and definitive taxonomy of business science. 
Rather the purpose of this paper is to start a debate which has been neglected for too long. 
Over the last 100 years business science has turned from a small formal garden into a jungle so 
to speak. A major restructuring effort is needed to accommodate the grown scope of that 
research programme. Thus, this paper wants to make an architectural suggestion how one 
could use what has grown in the past fifty or so years to create a garden that pleases the eye 
and has a recognisable structure and theme. The author is also aware that there is strong 
political resistance from the conservative mainstream at establishing a debate about the 
epistemology of business science. Many mainstream scholars refuse to subdivide the field at all 
and thus the four research programmes (or paradigms) suggested in this paper will face strong 
opposition. However, like a formal garden, a scientific field should have some structure and 
academic inquisitiveness should be able to overcome attempts to quash resistance.  
 
The paper will start with a brief discussion of Burrell/Morgan’s matrix and then will suggest a 
different four-fold taxonomy of research programmes within business science. The two 
dimensions forming the newly proposed matrix will discussed in some depth, then two of the 
research programmes (paradigms) will be discussed. The paradigms represent the extrema of a 
suggested continuum (with the two other paradigms somewhere on the continuum) and are 
therefore especially important. One of the research programmes – I named it Traditional 
Business Administration – is the ideology underlying the mainstream in business science. It will 
be dealt with at first. Then the second extremum, which I have christened Management, will be 
discussed. Thus, the major aim of the paper is achieved: I would like to propose a somewhat 
clearer map of business science compared to what exists today in the minds of most students 
and practitioners so that a robust and fertile division of labour between the two (four) paradigms 
can be established. The paradigms all have underlying idiosyncratic strengths and weaknesses 
which make them useful for solving different problems. If the problems for which every research 
programme is particularly suited could be identified, progress in science and in practice of would 
be accelerated. Paradigms are assumed to be incommensurable (Kuhn 1962). While I support 
the view that for different problems different problem-solving methods coming from different 
paradigms should be applied I am less sceptical than Kuhn about the chances of a meaningful 
exchange. The paper argues that while incommensurability is desired (and created) by the 
proponents of the mainstream, because it superficially strengthens epistemological rigour within 
the paradigm and thus reinforces the ideology, for practice and scientific advancement 
incommensurability is far less attractive. Any theory should make room for debate and not take 
it away. Thus, the proposed differentiation aims not at creating hermetically sealed discussions 
within the different paradigms, but at injecting structure and a neutral language into a badly 
needed inter-paradigmatic debate. At the end I will discuss which concrete fields or problems 
seem to offer themselves to the two paradigms.  
 
The paper will try to integrate ideas about the structure of the discipline by reviewing the basic 
business literature. The literature on the epistemology of business science – while highly 
relevant – will only be included when it seems unavoidable with respect to a particular 
discussion. This happens both to preserve the clarity of the argument and to allow those  
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readers who have no formal training in the philosophy of science,
1 but who are nevertheless 
interested in the topic, to agree or disagree with the arguments. 
 
The reader will quickly realise that the author is somewhat biased towards the underdog of the 
two paradigms, Management. Having forewarned the readers I will nevertheless try to present 





2.     Paradigms in Sociology  
 
Many years ago two young radicals suggested a taxonomy for the social sciences. Since most 
business science scholars – except in the German-speaking world – tend to define themselves 
as social scientists of sorts, Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan’s matrix was an instant success. 
We will take their matrix, which has been used in countless doctoral theses and academic 
articles, as a starting point for this paper and move from a criticism of their classification to 
suggesting a new matrix which in our view meets the requirements of business science better.  
 
When Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan published their classification of social sciences in 
1979 it was quickly accepted as the definitive segmentation of the different research 
programmes inside business sciences. Few textbooks and dissertations managed without 
taking recourse to their matrix with the four famous sociological paradigms. Deetz (1996: 191) 
talks about the “almost hegemonic character” of the grid. Taking a fresh look at the model one 
might ask the rather heretic question, what its contribution to the understanding of the structure 
of the discipline is. In business science the two maybe most important criteria should be what a 
theory has done for practitioners and what it has done to further academic understanding of 
practical problems, or, to use Imre Lakatos’s (1978) phraseology and put it more generally, 
                                                 
1 It is quite astounding how many Doctors of Philosophy have virtually no knowledge or training in the 
Sociology of Regulation 
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Sociology of Radical Change 
Figure 1: Sociological Paradigms, Burrell/Morgan 1979, p. 22  
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whether the theory creates a positive problem shift. The first question is quickly answered and 
will probably not meet a lot of resistance. The practical value of the matrix is very close to nil. 
Thus, the huge success of the model must consequently rest on its enormous contribution to the 
theoretical advancement of business science. I would contend that notion as well for the simple 
reason that I consider the matrix not really an attempt to epistemologically segment the 
discipline into research programmes but rather a political positioning device. Deetz (1996: 191) 
supports this view: 
 
“When the grid and discussion were published in 1979, those of us doing alternative work 
readily embraced it for it gave each of us a kind of asylum. While some of us were 
uncomfortable with the dimensions and philosophical analysis, we happily accepted the 
newfound capacity to present ourselves to mainstream critics as doing fundamentally 
different, but legitimate, kinds of research and began to work on concepts and evaluation 
criteria within our now produced as different and unitary communities.” 
 
What is more, the mainstream very effectively used the matrix to stop a debate about other 
subdivisions in business science before it even started. A debate about essentially political 
issues was neither going anywhere nor would it threaten the mainstream’s ideology. Thus, 
Burrell/Morgan’s matrix was a welcome tool to avoid a real debate about the basic axioms and 
methodological issues and lead a harmless pseudo-debate instead.  
 
The value of the matrix in both dimensions (practical and theoretical) is further greatly 
diminished by the fact that the vast majority of management scholars and virtually all 
practitioners can be found in one quadrant, the functionalist paradigm. I would even argue that 
Gareth Morgan who has become one of the most eminent writers on organisations can now be 
found in this quadrant. His tremendously successful and influential metaphorical approach to 
organisational theory, Images of Organization, includes scattered bits and pieces of radical-
humanist/radical structuralist ideology, but really is placed firmly in the functionalist paradigm.
2 
The Deetz quote also shows that in the late 70s the discussion about a segmentation of the 
business sciences had frustrated many researchers so much, that they simply accepted the first 
somewhat plausible classification that came out. In my view the situation right now is very 
similar in as much as there is no meaningful classification of research programmes and there is 
a growing frustration about that fact. Many researchers are like ships without wind in their sails, 
they just drift with the aimless current. Thus research itself is aimless. If that would be the case, 
we would have wasted a whole generation of researchers and this situation should be rectified 
as soon as possible. 
 
Obviously there is a strong demand for a tool that partitions business science research into 
meaningful segments which help practitioners, students and management scholars alike. 
Practitioners, even those who took a business degree, have no overview of the field they 
studied, indeed they are mostly more confused after getting a business degree than before. 
Students struggle with different usages of the term ‘management’ in one and the same book
3 
and fail to make connections and see differences between ideas coming from totally different 
paradigms of business science. The book writers, the scholars themselves, seem to be either 
                                                                                                                                                             
philosophy of science.  
2 The purpose of the book was to enable managers to make organisations more efficient and effective by 
allowing them to see an organisation from different metaphorical angles. The hugely successful executive 
edition is another indication that the book is written from within the functionalist paradigm. 
3 The grand old man of German Banking simply renamed his standard work on banking. Bank Business 
Administration became Bank-Management, the content stayed the same (Hühn 2000).   
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without a clue even where they are positioned inside the discipline or they have very backward 
ideas about epistemology. Positivism for instance, after Popper and his neo-positivist revolution 
(he called it falsificationism) widely ridiculed as naive, today is the methodological ideology of 
choice in many research areas and virtually the only accepted method in some (Marketing for 




3.     The Matrix 
 
What I will try to outline in this paper is that there are at least four different research 
programmes or paradigms producing, and being characterised by, different sets of methods, 
philosophies and management tools. While the differences between these four segments are 
manifold two criteria seem to me to be of very great importance. They also have the advantage 
of being rather clear-cut. The two major differences are the two dimensions of the matrix 
proposed in this paper. Behind these two dimensions one finds a large number of 
characteristics which might even have the same importance as the two I have chosen. The 
paper will talk about these other dimensions in a discussion of the four quadrants. Thus, the two 
dimensions were chosen because they deliver the most meaningful quadrants, not because 
they are more important than other differentiating criteria. 
 
The first criterion (and the y axis) is the role scientists see for themselves vis-à-vis the 
practitioners; the second dimension is whether they see organisations (the objects management 
scholars are interested in) as being closed or open systems. The open/closed dichotomy also 
incorporates what is maybe the most important single division between the extrema of the 
business science continuum: the acceptance or dismissal of the rational actor / economic 
principle. I will try to explain the two criteria and then proceed to a more detailed discussion 
especially of the two extrema of the business science continuum, Traditional Business 
Administration and Management, before at the end of the paper suggesting a division of labour 





3.1       The First Dimension: The Role of Science and Scientists 
 
Management scholars can be divided into two groups by placing them at the two ends of an 
ideal-type continuum ranging from descriptive to prescriptive. Warren Bennis and James 
O’Toole have recently pleaded with American business school deans (and referees and editors) 
to stop modelling management to physics and accept that management methods are made for 
management practice not for classrooms and case studies. “Today it is possible to find tenured 
professors of management who have never set foot inside a real business except as 
customers.” (2005: 101) In the German-speaking world this type of professor is in fact the norm 
(by law) rather than the exception. No wonder that people who live in a world of clean models 
and quantifiable hypotheses see themselves as the ones making the rules the practitioners of 
management have to follow. I spent long afternoons with the founder of one of Europe’s top-
ranked business schools during which this grandseigneur lamented the unwillingness of 
German professors in particular to talk to executive students because these executives actually 
talked back and pointed out that there is a difference between theories and reality. Thus, the 
view of a large group of management scholars (I suspect it is the majority) see their role as rule  
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makers and the role of the managers to apply these rules without fail. This is quite an interesting 
logical manoeuvre, which has been called the “theoretic turn”, like the linguistic turn, in business 
science (Hühn, 2007, 284). Reality is seen as theory-dependent, i.e. theory defines what is real, 
or more precisely, what is allowed to be real. It is completely normal that rationality
4 – a totally 
unrealistic postulate – is assumed to be a law governing the behaviour of decision-makers (i.e. 
the objects under study). Management practice is viewed as a strictly controlled laboratory 
where new theories are tested. Managers are supposed to behave “rationally”, otherwise they 
are bad lab rats. The managers’ subordinates also behave rationally, i.e. they are motivated by 
only one factor: money (as an expression of material gain). F.W. Taylor’s flawed and much 
criticised assumption is the basis for Nobel-prize winning game theory. That the axioms of game 
theory are completely unrealistic matters little. The most important German business journals 
(double-blind peer reviewed) regularly publish papers in which the authors explain how 
managers make decisions with the help of equations which take half a page and are full of 
logarithms and Greek letters. Manager who make decisions not based on these formulae are 
bad (non-rational) managers. This of course means that all managers are bad managers and 
only the theoreticians of management are good. The subsequent de-coupling of theory and 
practice is the price traditionalists gladly pay. 
 
The other end of the continuum, the descriptive extremum, is made up of professors and 
consultants who look to practitioners to teach them, so that they can then identify patterns and 
spread these patterns among practitioners. Naturally they also create rules (theories, but rather 
less model-like and less exact) but they use inductive reasoning – which does not exist 
according to Carl Popper – instead of deducing a model from another model. Research for the 
descriptive faction is an iterative process of going into businesses and ruminating on what they 
have seen, while the prescriptive group relies on the basic theory or axioms (the rational model) 
to be right and build their theories on these old foundations which when being tested in practice 
always are refuted.
5 Thus, the difference between the two groups in terms of methodology 
seems not so big (it is bigger than it looks on first sight as we will show later); it is more a 
philosophical stance that includes humility and inquisitiveness as prime ingredients as opposed 







                                                 
4 I contest the existence of rationality in the real world. Rationality is a mere postulate, not a physical state 
of affairs with a separate existence. The rationale for acting not only differs from person to person but 
also inside individuals at different times. The assumption of a unified ratio for acting based on pseudo-
mathematical axioms is the basis for mainstream economics. Economist postulate that people act 
according to one rationality. What basis for a science is a postulate? A physicist who would ask atoms to 
behave in a certain manner and base a theory on this request would be considered a joke. An economist 
has a good chance to get the Nobel prize. 
5 Goshal (2005, 83) takes the very standard ultimatum game as an example. A proposer is asked to 
divide a gift between himself and a responder. If the responder rejects the offered gift, both players end 
up empty-handed. Since all players are rational, the proposer should offer one cent (or whatever is the 
smallest unit) and the responder will accept, because she is one cent richer than before. In experiments, 
that outcome is virtually unheard of. Most frequently a 50:50 split is offered, because lesser offers are 
considered insulting to the responder. A unified rationality is postulated by game theory, despite it being 
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Figure 2: An Open System 
3.2      The Second Dimension: The Systemic Viewpoint 
 
System theory comes in two very different versions, one of which is rather new and accordingly 
not widely known. The latter fights an uphill struggle against what psychiatrists call “anchoring”: 
what one has heard first is true and other things are automatically inferior. When Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy, Norbert Wiener, Ross Ashby and others developed a new meta-science in the late 
1940s they proposed a world made up of open systems interacting with each other in 
mathematically understandable ways. Later, in the 1960s, Stafford Beer (1972) and Humberto 
Maturana (1959) and much later Francesco Varela and Maturana (1980) together amongst 
others proposed that there is a second category of systems which are not open to their 
environments (their meta- or super-systems) but are systemically closed. General systems 
theory and open systems theory are identical because for the first thirty to forty years any 
system was assumed to be an open system.  
 
Put very simply – with an apologetic nod to the experts – an open system is a system which 
turns input into output by manipulating (and adapting) internal sub-systems. Ideally the output 
remains constant or at least within certain parameters. An organisation’s output can be profit; 
the output of the human body for instance is life. Because the input is changing all the time the 
open system must adapt its subsystems, its internal structure, to keep the output stable. In order 
to structure an open system efficiently one has to manipulate its structure from the outside. This 
manipulation is only possible because the system is open in the sense that an outsider can see 
and analyse its internal structure. A mere glance is enough to conclude that tools like business 
process re-engineering, the Balanced Scorecard, decision trees or time based competition are 
firmly grounded in open system theory. This world-view allows outsiders to analyse a system. 
i.e. to divide it into its subsystems or parts and, most importantly, place them in a linear chain. 
This makes organisations manageable, predictable, programmable like machines. Michael 
Porter’s famous value chain is another prime example of this logic. It depicts the company as a 
generically structured entity with analysable components working in a predetermined linear 
sequence. Porter retracted his generic value chain 1996 in favour of an idiosyncratic activity 
system which is of course a closed system. Porter, who was maybe the most important 
proponent of open system style (strategic) management theory, has made a 
Gefechtskehrtwende
6. Not only has his view of the organisation changed from one of a dead 
                                                 
6 A Gefechtskehrtwende is a naval manoeuvre developed by the German imperial navy. It involves a 
battle group making a 180° turn under full steam without a loss of positional integrity.  
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Input                                                                               Output 
The System: Complex
Figure 3:  A Closed System 
machine to one of a living and learning closed system. He also has changed the direction of 
influence. In his old thinking the company was embedded in an industry structure (which was 
governed by 5 forces) and had to find a position in order to survive, while his new model sees 
the organisation as influencing the environment. The company now is the most influential force, 
not the environment. A side effect is that this view makes the 5 forces model disintegrate as the 
market is neither a given nor governed by five independent forces but shaped by the actors in 
the market, the companies and the consumers. If a market cannot be analysed anymore, it 
cannot be predicted and thus, strategy stops being a plan and becomes an explorative learning 
experience. More of that later. 
 
The system is called closed, because it is a black box into which an outsider cannot look and 
whose logic (which is non-linear) will always remain in the dark and cannot be anticipated with 
certainty. Secondly, the system is self-referential; it has its own logic and also creates its own 
reality, which is constantly evolving. The cybernetician uses the word “autopoietic” 
(Maturana/Varela) to describe a system that creates its own logic, creates its own reality and 
keeps itself alive. Humans are excellent examples of closed systems. The brain is a closed 
system which decides according to very individual criteria (self-referential) which environmental 
inputs are accepted (cognition is an active process), how they are processed and finally how 
they are interpreted. Every brain has a different microstructure, and even if all brains would 
have the same structure, simply because the brain is a network and not a chain, the reactions of 
these structurally identical brains would not be the same, perhaps not even similar. The unique 
connections among the subsystems (neurons) deliver an idiosyncratic image of the meta-
system (the environment) and create the personality which is also unique. Every human being is 
a closed system with its own personal reality and real personality.
7 If humans were open 
systems answering to a central consciousness they would not be individuals, but automatons. 
Thus, humans, in the view of closed systems theory, cannot follow one rationality (principle), 
because they would lose what makes them human. Therefore, the open-closed dichotomy 
encompasses the one-rationality/multiple rationality divide in business science. 
 
Figure 3 shows graphically why closed systems are complex: it is no longer possible to 
comprehend the sub-systems’ relationship as a linear logical chain. This is precisely the reason 
why (cybernetic) management does not think that it is possible to manipulate a system (an 
organisation) at will. It has its own will, its own unfathomable dynamic. It is also no longer 
possible to predict the behaviour of a system; to see into the future. Think about yourself: can 
you be sure of your reaction to an event? Managing a closed system is not as easy as re-
engineering a machine; managers have to be very cautious and can let themselves be guided 
by looking at successive feedback loops. Again Porter may serve as an example. His generic 
                                                 
7 That humans are unique in their perception/creation of reality is actually corroborated by the fact that 
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Figure 4: Paradigms in Business Science 
value chain assumed that organisations have a certain structure and that the subsystems are 
working together in a predetermined way. His activity system on the other hand is unique for 
every company and the outcome of a learning process that should never end.  
 
When the two dimensions described above are combined in a two-by-two matrix the resulting 
four quadrants can be filled with research programmes. The labels I have chosen are merely for 
convenience and readers may replace them with their own. I started by criticising the matrix by 
Burrell/Morgan because its relevance to practitioners and management researchers is too small. 
Therefore an explanation as to why this matrix is better able to act as guidance for both groups 
must follow.  
 
 
4.      Quadrant One: Traditional Business Administration 
 
Most research is carried out in this quadrant and by and large students are exclusively taught 
this version. Professors understand their role as experts who give managers the tools they have 
to apply one-to-one in reality. The tools are based on linear logics since the assumption is that 
all organisations function like more or less complicated machines. Frederick Winslow Taylor’s 
mechanistic model is, a hundred years after it was proposed, still very much the state of the art. 
Norton/Kaplan’s Balanced Scorecard sees the organisation as a machine that has been 
programmed and whose parameters can be monitored and manipulated at will. Michael Porter’s 
ideas about strategy are an even better example. Again, Porter, who was given the chair for 
strategy at Harvard Business School with a background in economics, had for the first 15 years 
a traditional outlook. He took the old, totally mechanistic, SWOT model and did a little window 
dressing and came out with a slightly modified interpretation of the model. The SWOT model  
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has three major elements/phases: the external analysis, the internal analysis, and lastly the 
strategic option generation. These three elements Porter restructured and renamed: the 5 
forces model replaced the checklists of the external analysis, the value chain gave the internal 
analysis a firm structure, and generic strategies replaced the worrisome chaos of the option 
generation phase. Old Porter decoupled analysis even further from reality than was the case 
with the SWOT model; he made matters worse. Originally, the SWOT model was based on the 
assumption, that the internal and the external analysis have the same importance. That does 
not work with an open systems view as the linearity of cause and effect cannot be upheld: the 
cause must always logically and chronologically precede the effect, which would not be the case 
with a simultaneous analysis. Porter consequently stated quite clearly that the subsystem (the 
organisation) is dependent on the super system (the industry). Thus, the industry analysis with 
the 5 forces model delivered the requirements which the organisation had to meet in order to be 
successful. Maybe Porter’s greatest (and most naïve and harmful) contribution to management 
was that he turned what was the most difficult part of the SWOT model, the generation of 
strategic options, into the easiest part. He proposed that there really are only two options for any 
given company. Large companies could choose between Cost Leadership and Differentiation, 
while small companies choose between Cost Focus and Differentiation Focus. He cut down the 
choices from an endless number to two. Strategy-making as child’s play. Anyone who has ever 
involved in the strategy process knows that this is at best wishful thinking. It is one of the 
characteristics of Traditional Business Administration to have very simple models which are 
based on a number-focused operationalisation. Porter, and before him all his colleagues at 
Harvard, even assumed that they could calculate the future (the strategy). This is only possible 
within a strictly linear open system view and rational actors behaving as the models needs them 
to behave. Chance and entrepreneurial creativity do not exist in such a world view; a 
preposterous assumption as Hoppe (1997: 56) explains: 
 
“First off, if our expectations (predictions) concerning our future actions were indeed as 
rational as rational expectation theorists believe them to be, this would imply that it would 
be possible to give an exhaustive classification of all possible actions (just as one could list 
all possible outcomes of a game as roulette or all possible locations of a physical body in 
space). For without a complete enumeration of all possible types of actions there can be 
no knowledge of their relative frequencies. Obviously, no such list of all possible human 
actions exists, however.” 
 
Porter indeed assumed that the strategist had an exhaustive classification in front of him/her: 
the two strategic alternatives of his matrix of generic strategies. A page later Hoppe (1997: 57) 
shows in another manner just how logically absurd the theory of rational expectation is – which 
is of course the theoretical fundament of Traditional Business Administration: 
 
“as far as the assumption that all actors possess identical knowledge is concerned, any 
proponent of this view is caught in a performative contradiction: his words are belied by 
the very fact of uttering them […] Rational expectations theorists, too, by virtue of 
presenting their ideas to the reading public, must obviously assume that the public does 
not yet know what they already know, and hence, that the public’s predictions concerning 
the future course of actions – in contrast to their own predictions – will be systematically 
flawed until it has successfully absorbed the lesson of rational expectation.” 
 
If Traditional Business Administration starts from flawed premises concerning human actions its 
domain obviously cannot be what is widely know as management, organising people, stra-
tegising, leading. It must be a field where predictability rules and were their prescriptive stance 
does not bind managers to mechanistic models which systematically deliver bad solutions.   
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5.     Quadrant Four: Management 
 
The upper right quadrant is created when a closed systems view and a descriptive outlook 
come together and I have chosen to call it Management. One would think that this research 
programme cannot be older than closed systems theory. However, I will argue that the so-called 
Human Resources/Relations Movement was the starting point and the writings of Mintzberg 
(from 1975 till now), whom I personally rate as the first pure Management scholar, were always 
firmly within the closed systems/descriptive camp.  
 
During the Hawthorne Experiments Taylorist researchers were confounded by the unpredictable 
actions of the groups under study. To these scientists the organisation was a machine that 
could be programmed. However, they had to acknowledge that their manipulation of the working 
conditions (number and length of breaks, lighting, etc.) was in no way connected to the output. 
So they called in famous psychologist Elton Mayo
8 from Harvard University. Mayo, after 15 
years of intensive studies concluded that there were two organisations, one formal and one 
informal. The more important to him was the informal organisation. The discovery of two 
intertwined organisational structures meant that simple manipulations could not work anymore 
as the ability to predict the actions of individuals and the group were gone. The resultant system 
resembles a closed system. Especially the Bank Wiring Room Experiment (the workers 
informally agreed on an output among themselves) describes a system that is partly closed vis-
à-vis its environment. In effect Mayo’s conclusion preceded constructivism by maybe thirty 
years. Only in the 1980s did the organisational culture movement make the assumption popular 
that the formal structures are not real, because they are interpreted (through different filters like 
organisational culture; national culture, professional culture, etc.) by individuals.  
 
When Henry Mintzberg wrote his seminal two works on organisational structure and power 
(1979, 1983) and thereby founded the Gestalt approach of management, he in effect transferred 
the closed systems thinking from psychology to the management mainstream. Mintzberg’s 
theory was inclusive: it incorporated all previous ideas about organisations and integrated them 
in one big field theory. His organisational gestalts (or forms as he later called them) were 
Weberian ideal types which had their own internal logic, were relatively closed vis-à-vis their 
environment, and created the conditions which upheld their viability. They were the very 
autopoietic systems described by Maturana/Varela in their groundbreaking 1980 work 
“Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living”.  
 
Not only Mintzberg operates under the assumption that their role is that of an observer rather 
than an a-priori expert and that systems can and should be designed so that they can be totally 
controlled like a machine. Many of the foremost management scholars share these convictions. 
Edgar Schein, Peter Drucker, new (and silent) Michael Porter.  
 
Again, the icon of Traditional style strategy-making, Michael Porter, may serve as a perfect 
example for the general argument of this paper, namely that a solid theoretical/philosophical 
structure/positioning is important for scientific progress. Some major errors in Porter’s new 
theory of strategy could have been avoided easily and this may serve as an example how the 
absence of a meaningful structure is harming scientific advancement (more examples will given 
in part 6). 
 
                                                 
8 Mayo was not really a psychologist, he was social science expert trained and self-educated in a number 
of relevant disciplines.  
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 The value of Porter’s contribution to strategy rose dramatically once he changed his theoretical 
stance from an open to a closed system perspective and from a prescriptive to a descriptive 
stance. In his seminal 1996 paper, What is Strategy?, he defines strategy very succinctly: 
 
“What is strategy? We can now complete the answer to this question. Strategy is 
creating fit among a company’s activities.“ (Porter, 1996, p. 75) 
 
Compare that to his 1980s approach, where strategy-making was the analysis of a company’s 
market and the subsequent positioning of the company in the market. In his whole 1996 paper 
the market or market analysis are not mentioned. Porter swings from the view that the company 
(the system) is dependent on the market (the meta-system), to a view where the company is a 
closed system creating/influencing the market. This is a perfect turnabout. What is more, Porter 
could have easily avoided some major mistakes in his paper, if he would have been aware that 
he had switched paradigms and not merely changed from one viewpoint to another. His biggest 
mistake is his attempt to introduce efficiency considerations into what is now a closed system 
perspective and therefore should look primarily at effectiveness.
9 He suggests that managers 
should create a strong fit between the individual activities.
10 The highest order of fit is 
optimization of effort (1996, 72). His practical example of what he also calls third order fit is The 
Gap. Of all the company examples in the paper The Gap is the only company which has been 
experiencing (still is) serious problems. Had Porter understood that he had left open system 
territory, where efficiency considerations take precedence over effectiveness (as is the case in 
closed system theory), he could have avoided a big mistake. His explanation of different types 
of fit clashes with his new frame of reference, closed system theory.  
 
In his 1996 paper Porter also moves from a Traditionalist’s prescriptive stance to a decidedly 
descriptive view. His generic, linear and therefore largely useless model of the organisation, the 
value chain, is replaced by company-specific Activity Systems.
11 Not anymore do scholars like 
Porter dictate generic structures, but managers have created idiosyncratic structures and 
scholars like Porter discover them. This may seem like a minor point compared to the open to 
closed system shift, but it is possibly even more important for the Traditionalist research 
programme. The Traditionalist paradigm – especially the Harvard school of strategy – is based 
on creating cooking-recipes for the manager/cook. The managers diligently load the meat-
grinder (any theory, for instance the SWOT model or Porter’s five forces model) with data and 
they always get a strategy in the end. Then they monitor the functioning of the organisational 
machine with the Balanced Scorecard and keep the steamer on the charted course. Porter’s 
new view on strategy does not allow for such a simplistic bridging of the theory-practice divide. 
And that is extremely brave of Porter because he leaves the tradition of the most prestigious 
business school in the world and declares their paedagogical ideology (training cooks/managers 
by letting them apply theoretical cooking recipes on theoretical case studies) bankrupt. 
 
If Porter would try to get familiar with his new theoretical basis, closed system theory and the 
                                                 
9 Peter Drucker (1964, 5) states that “effectiveness rather than efficiency is essential in business“. 
10 Strategy managers now create fit between internal company-specific activities, whereas in his old 
approach strategy managers created a fit between the market and a company. That means the central 
concept of fit is radically different from before and strategising is also not analysing the market and then 
adapting the company, but only managing internal activities. 
11 Porter is not really used to thinking in complex systems and it shows. The connections in his activitz 
systems are not complete and he mixes activities with attributes. Closed system management scholars 
like Markus Schwaninger, Stafford Beer and of course Peter Gomez and others have been using activity 
systems for decades before Porter discovered them. It is another example how isolated even major 
scholars are.  
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descriptive view, he would be able to rejoin the strategy debate (he has not published anything 
significant on corporate strategy since 1996) and would probably be able to get back to the 
cutting edge.  
 
Take another example from strategic management. In 1990 the core competence concept 
totally changed that field of study. Gary Hamel and CK Prahalad, in a short paper, published in 
the Harvard Business Review (it is indicative that the HBR, a non-academic paper regularly 
gives space to outsiders who become founders of prominent schools of thought) flipped the 
strategy debate in one year from a Traditionalist to a Management approach. They took one 
company as an example
12 and completely changed how people thought about strategic 
problems. According to them core competences are the product of a cross-organisational 
learning process (core competences are thus knowledge); the market plays no role in the 
strategy process anymore other than ex post defining which company produced the most 
successful knowledge. Old Porter’s positivist open system perspective with dependent and 
reactive/passive companies is replaced by a fully constructivist closed system view with active 
companies creating and shaping the meta-system (the market). 
 
In order to keep the argument coherent and for the sake of brevity I would like to leave it at that. 
The suggested two dimensions – even more so if they are augmented with other dimensions – 
open up a new view on the general structure of research in business science. One gets a rather 
good overview of which research programmes are connected in which way and also 
understands the specific problems they are dealing with. Again, the suggested dimension and 
the resulting research programmes are not definitive, but I believe they can be a useful tool for 






6.  A Division of Labour between Management  &  Traditional      
Business Administration 
 
In the early 20
th century Henri Fayol (1949, book first published in 1916) proposed an 
astonishingly far-seeing classification of business activities, which could be taken as a rough 
guide to assign the business activities to the suggested paradigms in business science: 
 
• technical activities: production 
• commercial activities: procurement, sales, exchange 
• financial activities: search for the optimum use of capital 
• security activities: protection of materiel and personnel 
• accounting activities: stock control, balance sheet, costs, statistics 
• managerial activities: forecasting (prevoyance), organising, giving orders, co-ordinate, 
control 
 
                                                 
12 Management is happy to work with anecdotal empirical data, while Traditionalists prefer statistically 
valid sample sizes. These respective proclivities stem from the paradigms’ descriptive/prescriptive 
outlook. If a researcher has a descriptive outlook it is not important whether one or one thousand 
companies are successful with a new approach. They are not looking for eternal truths which are 
expressed in models, but more for heuristics, pointers, philosophies.  
 
13
As I mentioned at the beginning I will restrict myself to describing a division of labour only 
between the two extremes of the continuum of business science research programmes.  
 
According to what was maybe the first Management scholar, Henri Fayol, Traditional Business 
Administration seems to be well equipped for technical activities and accounting activities, but 
probably not so well equipped for the commercial activities and not at all suited for the 
managerial activities. This follows mainly from the view of what the role of the scientist is. A 
prescriptive attitude needs a field of interest for which stable predictions can be made and for 
which a theory is a good heuristic to find a solution to a problem. That generally also includes 
operations research, although sometimes what seems like a straight-forward technical problem 
turns out to have a social component. What Horst Rittel (1969) so endearingly called a wicked 
problem is a nice example. The programming of three lifts in a high-rise turned out to have such 
a human component (Conklin 2007). The goal of programming the three lifts is to have an 
optimised solution, i.e. have the most optimal availability of lifts for any given demand. If theory 
is employed the basic starting assumption is that this theory delivers that perfect solution, i.e. 
that the theory is an appropriate solution generator. A perfect solution means that there is no 
chance to further improve the solution. Learning is not included because it cannot happen. The 
problem of course is that very few problems have a solution which cannot be improved on. 
Thus, operations research, involving the optimisation of a future production process is suddenly 
a doubtful application of Traditional Business Administration ideology. That is so because of the 
confluence of learning, a preparation for the future and human interaction, which means there 
are no final solutions. This very much sounds like I am preparing a case for abandoning 
Traditional Business Administration completely. I am not. That science is not an exact science 
may sound a little paradoxical, but should, 80 years after Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle and 
20 years into a constructivist debate, be widely accepted. Thus, if a research programme 
delivers superior outcomes (an a priori assumption based on experience and the rule of thumb), 
i.e. it is a promising heuristic tool, it should take precedence over the inferior research 
programme. Since Traditional Business Administration ideology is focused on solving simple to 
complicated problems with the help of theories and models based on mathematics and linear 
logics, operations research, accounting, taxes, etc. are clearly areas for which it is better suited 
than Management ideology. The example shows, however, that Traditional Business 
Administration could learn from Management and make, in this case, Operations Research 
more robust and give research a new open-ended path. 
 
Management on the other hand seems to thrive on complex and open-ended problems involving 
an uncertain future. The readers may forgive me this pleonasm, but it is still not widely accepted 
that the future is indeed uncertain, despite Ludwig von Mises’s (the academic mentor of Hayek) 
assurance that “[t]he honest historicist would have to say: Nothing can be asserted about the 
future.” (Mises, 1985, 203)  Attempts to talk about strategic problems for instance, must be 
based on the assumptions of the Management paradigm. The Balanced Scorecard is therefore 
a futile attempt, so are the development of balance sheets for measuring organisational 
knowledge or culture.  
 
Going back to Fayol’s “forecasting (prévoyance), organising, giving orders, co-ordinate, control” 
one has a complete description of areas in which the Management would deliver more robust 
and effective solutions that Traditional Business Administration. The first four are more or less 
concerned with the unknowable future and they deal with human problems on top of that. Even 
the last one, control, in my opinion clearly is more in the realm of Management than the 
Traditionalist camp. It is in fact, as we argued previously, the issue which caused the separation 
of Management from the Traditional research programme. Impersonal control creates self-
organisation in a group, as the Hawthorne Experiments showed. Despite these rather old  
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findings, the most popular German-language textbook on Business Administration, referred to 
simply as The Wöhe
13, still holds on to quite outlandish assumptions. Leadership for instance 
must be rid of personal elements, it must be neutralised (Wöhe, 2002, 254). It is not really 
surprising that research in Leadership is not really flourishing on the basis of such absurd 
assumptions, which are only needed so that numbers, not incalculable human variables are the 
basis for theories. Thus leadership is a field of research where the Management ideology will 
produce much more fruitful results. One of the oldest discussions in leadership, whether 
managers are also always leaders and vice versa, can instantly be ended, because by definition 
a manager is only a (first line) manager if he leads people. A person who is not supervising 
others is not a manager and therefore also not a leader. What is more, the confusion about the 
terms managing, manager, and management disappears. Employees with a supervision span of 
0 who write contracts or collect figures, can no longer be called contract managers or finance 
managers. Even worse usages of these terms, like engine management, water management, 
waste management, etc, are instantly unmasked as nonsensical.  
 
Tweaking a few of the minor assumptions only makes the situation worse. Traditionalist must 
allow Management protagonists onto the playing field. It will do the whole field of business 
science a world of good. A proper basic division of labour, which gives guidance without 
destroying a meaningful exchange of ideas, could create focus and academic openness at the 
same time. Both paradigms (the other two which I neglected as well) have a lot to gain from an 
open discourse, not only the underdog Management paradigm. However, the discourse needs a 
proper grammar and vocabulary. If the terminology is not even clear, how can that discourse 
happen? The only way to push forward the boundaries of knowledge is the adherence to the 
essence of academic work, which according to Mark Blaug (1992: 42) is “remain[ing] loyal to the 
ideal of intellectual competition”. Thus, a new delineation and typology of business science is 
needed. Burrell and Morgan’s grid delivered neither a useful grammar nor debating platform. At 
the moment the situation in business science is rather perverse in that the acknowledged icons 
of Management are not shaping mainstream thinking because mainstream thinking is within 
Traditional Business Administration. One of the reasons for this is, that teaching simple models 
which involve no risk just diligent application is easier than telling students (MBAs especially) 
that they cannot be taught perfect management and strategy and that indeed luck and creativity 
are the decisive ingredients. The question then is what is more important, easy lectures and 
good advertising arguments or proper education and honest science? No competition, one 
would have hoped. The other reason is that fewer and fewer researchers have the necessary 












                                                 
13 The Wöhe is a 1300-page introduction into Business Administration and was written by the nestor of 
German Business Administration Günter Wöhe and is so precious to German Business Administration 
that it is still published under Wöhe’s name, despite him having stopped working on it some 15 years ago. 
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